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OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is found in Oak Lane
Homeowners Assoc, v. Griffin, 219 P.3d 64 (Utah App. 2009). A copy of the decision is
included as Addendum B in the Appendix attached to Oak Lane's Brief.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case pursuant to UCA §78A-3-102(3)(a) (2010).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was initiated by Oak Lane on November 19, 2003. R.2. On 12/8/04 the
trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the Griffins. R.441. Oak Lane
appealed that decision and the summary judgment was overturned by the Court of
Appeals, on the basis that disputed issues of material fact precluded the award of
summary judgment on the grounds found by the trial court, and remanded to the trial
court. R.473.
On remand, the Griffins' filed for summary judgment on a different basis than that
previously granted by the court. R.660. That motion was granted by the Trial Court in its
order of 12/21/07. Oak Lane appealed this order. On September 11, 2009 the Court of
Appeals filed its opinion affirming the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment to the
Griffins. On or about October 9, 2009 Oak Lane filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
with this Court, which petition was granted.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

The Alpine City Council approved and accepted the Oak Hills Haven plat, which
contained five lots, on January 13, 1977. A copy of the plat is attached to
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment R.665.

2.

The plat clearly identifies Oak Lane as a "Private Lane". R.665.

3.

The Oak Hills Haven Subdivision consists of five lots. R.665.

4.

Defendants, Dennis and ReNae Griffin own Lot 2 of the Oak Hills Haven
Subdivision. Affidavit of ReNae Griffin. ReNae Griffin's affidavit was submitted
with her prior Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment R.662.

5.

The Griffins purchased the property in 1988. R.662.

6.

For almost sixteen years, and until October of 2003, the Griffins accessed their
home on Lot 2 on a nearly daily basis by using Oak Lane, the cul de sac in the Oak
Hills Haven Subdivision.R.662.

7.

In 2003 all of the other lot owners in the Subdivision formed the Oak Lane
Homeowners Association. A copy of the recorded Declaration of Covenants and
Restrictions is located at R.661.

8.

On or about July 22, 2003, the Association obtained a quit claim deed from the
original owners of the lots in the subdivision to the property comprising the road.
R.651.

9.

Based solely on this quit claim deed, the Plaintiff claims ownership of the road.
R.18.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There was only one issue in Oak Lane's Petition. That issue was whether the
reservation of a street on a subdivision plat map creates an easement in favor of the
owners' of property in the subdivision over those roads. At the trial court level and on
appeal Oak Lane argued that recognition of the easement creates a new type of easement,
not previously recognized in Utah. This is not true.
The law in Utah and other jurisdictions is absolutely clear that property owners
adjoining a street in a recorded subdivision plat have an easement to use those roads. Oak
Lane has failed to cite to a single authority in support of its claim that this is not the law.
Plaintiff instead tries to argue, without authority, that Utah only recognizes four types of
easements and this type of easement is not one of the four. This argument is wrong on
both counts. The easement at issue would fall squarely within the definition of express
easement, and even if that is not so Utah Courts have recognized the applicability of this
type of easement for almost 100 years. 1
In its brief, Petitioner raises a new argument for the first time. This argument is
that the failure to dedicate Oak Lane as a public street, at the time the Plat was accepted
by Alpine City, constituted an abandonment of the road necessitating the evaluation of
additional factors involving convenience and usage. There is no support for Oak Lane's
position. Oak Lane argues the Court of Appeals decision was made without consideration
of three Utah cases, Mason v. State of Utah, 656 P.2d 465 (Utah 1982), Carrier v.
1 In its decision, the Court of Appeals did not determine whether the easement was express or implied, finding this
easement has characteristics of both, holding that question was not relevant. Oak Lane v. Griffin at 6-7, see alsofn. 4.
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Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001) and Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 97
P.3d 697 (Utah App. 2004). In its initial brief, Oak Lane did not cite to a single one of
these cases.

The Griffins cited to the Carrier decision in their brief and it was

subsequently addressed by Oak Lane in its Reply Brief. The Court of Appeals decision
cites to the Carrier decision at pages 67and 68 and to the Evans case at page 70. The
allegation that the cases were not considered is therefore false. Furthermore nothing in
these cases in any way contradicts the holding of the Court of Appeals in this case.
Finally, Oak Lane challenges the non Utah authority supporting the Court of
Appeals decision on the basis that it is not binding. This is readily apparent. The treatises
and other authority were not cited or accepted as binding authority, rather they were used
in harmony with Utah case law to show the position taken by the Court of Appeals is in
harmony with the majority view.
Oak Lane has failed to cite to a single authority or decision that is contrary to the
holding of the Court of Appeals. Its unhappiness with the holding of the numerous
authorities that are contrary to its position is not a basis for overturning the decision of
either the trial court or the court of appeals.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CREATION OF THE SUBDIVISION GIVES THE GRIFFIN'S AN
EASEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

A.

Utah Law Supports The Existence Of The Easement.
The determination of whether an easement exists is a question of law. Carrier v.
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Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112, 1116 (Utah 2001). Utah Law recognizes that when a subdivision
is created, an easement is created over private streets, contained in the subdivision for
those property owners who abut those streets.
In the Treatise THOMAS AND BACKMAN ON UTAH REAL PROPERTYLAW'it
states:
When an owner subdivides property in accordance with a map (or plat or plan), a
purchaser of a lot within the subdivision acquires an easement over private streets
as laid out on the map even if the easement is not expressly created in the
documents of conveyance.
THOMAS AND BACKMAN ON UTAH REAL PROPERTY LA W, §12.02(b) (2) (iii) pg.
529.
Likewise in the Treatise UTAH REAL ESTATE LA Wfor Brokers and Salespersons
it states:
Other Implied Easements. These arise when subdividers lay out streets and lots
on a plat map or plan of the tract. When the lots bounded by streets are sold, an
easement in favor of the lot purchaser, for access over the street, arises by
implication.
UTAH REAL ESTATE LAW for Brokers and Salespersons, Corny, Edward J., §21.6.0
Creation of Easements by Implication.
Utah case law has long recognized the creation of an easement, for use of roads, in
favor of property owners upon recordation of a subdivision plat map. In Carrier v.
Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112, 1116 (Utah 2001) the Utah Supreme Court stated " Under Utah
law, landowners whose property abuts public streets, alleys, and public ways that appear
on a plat map are entitled to a private easement over those public ways." Carrier at 1116.
5

The Carrier court cited with approval to the 1912 Utah Supreme Court decision in Tuttle
v. Sowadski, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959 (1912) wherein the court held:
No doubt the law is to the effect that purchasers buying lots with reference to a map
or plat which is authorized by the owner of the ground, and such map or plat to be a
street or alley, then, and in such event, the purchasers acquire a right to have such
street or alley maintained as such, and the owner of the ground is estopped from
vacating or obstructing the same.
Tuttle at 962.
The Carrier court also cited with approval to the Supreme Court decision in
Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952). In Boskovich the
court held: "If the dedicated streets of a subdivision are laid out and the right to the use
thereof has arisen, a private easement arises therein which constitutes a vested proprietary
interest in the lot owners ...." Boskovich at 431. The court also cited with approval to the
Thomas real property treatise cited above. Carrier at 1116.
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals in Evans v. Board of County Comm V, 97 P.3d
697 (UT App 2004) aff d 123 P.3d 432 (Utah 2005) recognized Utah's "longstanding
doctrine that a private easement over platted streets arises upon the purchase of property
with reference to the plat map, so long as the roads have not been legally vacated prior to
the purchase."
Contrary to the Plaintiffs unsupported assertion, the law in Utah clearly does
recognize an easement upon recordation of a subdivision plat, and has done so for over
100 years.
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B.

Other Authorities Likewise Recognize The Existence Of An Easement Upon
Recordation.
Utah law follows the general rule across the country. In 25 Am Jur. 2d Easements

andLicenses§26 (1966) it states:
Generally, where property sold is described in the conveyance with reference to a
plat or map on which streets, alleys, parks and other open areas are shown, an
easement therein is created in favor of the grantee. Such an easement is deemed a
part of the property to which the grantee is entitled and of which he cannot be
divested except by due process of law. It exists entirely independent of the fact of
dedication to public use.
A search of other jurisdictions shows universal support for the position taken in
Am Jur. For example in Carolina Land Company, Inc. v. Bland, 217 S.E.2d 16 (S.C.
1975) The Court stated:
We have held that where a deed describes land as is shown on a certain plat, such
becomes a part of the deed. It is generally held that when the owner of land
conveys lots with reference to the pint, he thereby dedicates said streets to the use
of such lot owners, their successors in title and the public. Blue Ridge Realty Co. v.
Williamson, 247 S.C. 112, 145 SE. (2d) 922. We also held in the cited case that the
purchaser of lots with reference to the plat of the subdivision acquired every
easement, privilege, and advantage shown upon said plat, including the right to the
use of all the streets, near or remote, as laid down on that plat by which the lots
were purchased. We also held as between the owner, who has conveyed lots
according to a plat and his grantee or grantees, the dedication is complete when the
conveyance is made, even though the street is not accepted by the public
authorities.
Carolina Land Company at 18.
Likewise in Johnson v. Skyline Telephone Membership Corp., 365 S.E.2d 164
(N.C. App. 1988) the court stated:
It is well established that an owner who subdivides his property and records a plat
showing the existence of street and roads within the subdivision impliedly grants to
purchasers of lots in the subdivision the right to use these streets and roads.
7

Johnson at 165.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated the rule as follows:
It is familiar law that where lots are sold by reference to a recorded plat or plan
showing existing or proposed streets which constitute boundaries of the lots, a
conveyance ordinarily operates to convey to the grantee the fee simple to land
underlying adjoining streets and rights of way to the center line thereof, together
with easements to use such rights of way as well as others which do not bound the
lot conveyed.
Gagnon v. Moreau, 225 A.2d 924 (N.H. 1967)
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Nelson v. Roscommon Co Rd Comm, 117 Mich
App 125; 323 NW2d 621(1982) stated:
A grantee of property in a platted subdivision acquires a private right entitling him
to use of the streets and ways laid down on the plat, regardless of whether there
was a sufficient dedication and acceptance to create public rights.
Cited in Beckwith v. Deeg, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1172.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals gave a more detailed explanation for the theory on
which the rights are created. There the court stated:
We believe that law is well established that when land is sold by reference to a plat
upon which several street and avenues are laid out, the grantee acquires an
easement in the street or way upon which his lot is situated, and in such other
streets or ways as are necessary or convenient to enable him to reach a highway. In
every road dedication by plat there are two recipients of rights. Those recipients are
the representative governing body and the abutting landowners who purchased on
the promise of the plat. The fee does not rest in the governing body. That body has
the right to accept the dedication as a public trust and maintain the road. If the
public body rejects that dedication, that fact does not affect the fee and remaining
rights in the abutting landowner. The fee that is in the abutting landowner is subject
to the easement rights of others. If there is a public acceptance of the road, the fee
is burdened with the rights of the general public to use the land as a public road
until such time as it is closed by public authority. If there is not public acceptance
there yet remains an easement upon the fee. The easement is a collective private
8

easement. Each landowner who purchase under such a recorded plat is entitled to a
private road easement over the lands shown as roads on the plat to their termines
with public roads. Such easement is not one of necessity, but one of convenience
for which he and each adjoining owner paid.
Cummings v. Palmer, 753 S.W.2d 675,677 (Tenn. App, 1987).
Finally, in Illinois there are an entire line of cases which uphold this legal principle.
Many of these cases are cited in Cook v. Mighell Construction Company, Inc. 353 N.E.2d
43 (111. App. 1976).
... .the purchasers of lots in the platted subdivision have a right against the plattor
or his privies, to have the tracts marked on the plat as roadways kept open for their
use, regardless of whether they have been accepted as highways....
No law is better settled in this State than that which controls this case. Where the
owner of land lays it out in lots and blocks and makes and exhibits a plat thereof
showing streets and alleys and sells some of the lots with a clear reference to the
plan, the purchaser acquires as appurtenant to the lots every easement, privilege
and advantage which the plan represents as belonging to them as a part of the
platted territory
It is a settled principle that where the owner of an estate has divided it into
different parts, as lots and alley or ways, and so arranged them that one part derives
an advantage from another of a permanent, open and visible character, and has
afterwards sold a part of the property, the purchaser takes the part sold with all the
benefits and burdens which appear at the time of the sale to belong to it. It is not
necessary that the easement claimed by the grantee be absolutely necessary for the
enjoyment of the estate granted, but it is sufficient that it is highly convenient and
beneficial thereto.
Cook at 46-48.
In reading through Plaintiffs brief it appears its defenses fall into three claims (1)
Oak Lane is a private lane and not a public street (2) there is no specific reference to the
Lane in the deed given to the Griffins and (3) the Griffins have other access to public
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streets.
As referenced in the treatises and the case law, the fact that the street is a private
lane and not a public street is irrelevant. The Defendants are not "public" members
seeking access, they are the owners of property in the subdivision, indeed, they are owners
of property actually adjoining the street. The easement was created and effective for the
owners of Lot 2 at the time the subdivision was created, and is still there today.
The treatises and case law also expressly state that the easement is created at the
time the subdivision is recorded "even if the easement is not expressly created in the
documents of conveyance." THOMAS AND BACKMAN ON UTAH REAL PROPERTY
LAW, § 12.02(b)(2)(iii) pg. 529.
Whether there was any other access to the property to Defendants' property is also
completely irrelevant. The easement is not one of necessity, but one of convenience, and
enjoyment.
The undisputed facts are that the Griffin's property description is Lot 2 Oak Hills
Haven. It's legal description is defined by and was created at the time the subdivision plat
was recorded. The Plat shows the creation of a private lane for the benefit of the
subdivision. The private lane abuts the Griffin's property. There are no disputes as to
any of these elements and accordingly, as a matter of law the Griffin's have an easement
over Oak Lane.
C.

There Is No Need To Identify The Type of Easement Involved.
Plaintiff cites to Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 1999) for the proposition
10

that there are only four types of easements recognized in Utah law. The Court in Potter
examined four different types of easement to determine whether there was an easement in
that case. Nothing in the decision claims that these are the only types of easement
recognized at law in Utah.
Indeed the learned treatises cited above specifically identify the easement created by
plat as a separate type of easement from the four identified in Potter. For purposes of the
summary judgment motion at issue here, the Griffins did not claim an easement by
necessity, prescription or implication. Accordingly the Plaintiffs analysis of these
easements is a waste of time.
It could be argued that easement by plat does however fit into the category of an
express easement. An express easement is one that is expressly created between two
parties in a land transaction by an express grant or reservation. The express easement
also requires mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intent to be bound by its terms
and consideration.
In the instant case the initial property owners of the land in the subdivision created the
plat which they all acceded to, reserving land for Oak Lane and in return the city granted
them the right and privilege of subdividing the land into lots. In essence, although it is a
separate form of easement, the easement created through the recordation of a plat would
meet all requirements of an express easement as well.
II. OAK LANE'S CITED CASES DO NOT SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENTS.
Oak Lane's entire premise for this Petition is that Utah Law does not recognize an
11

easement by plat. In its current petition Oak Lane argues that three Utah decisions stand
for the proposition that there is no easement by plat Mason v. State of Utah, 656 P.2d 465
(Utah 1982), Carrier v. Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001) and Evans v. Board of
County Commissioners, 97 P.3d 697 (Utah App. 2004).
In its initial appellate brief, Oak Lane did not cite to any of these cases. In its reply
brief it cited only to the Carrier case. It is disingenuous and improper for Oak Lane to be
first raising these authorities after appeal let alone after the initial hearings in this matter.
However, even if this Court were to consider the three cited cases, they do not support
Oak Lane's position.
A. The Mason Case Does Not Support Oak Lane's Position.
In Mason v. State of Utah, 656 P.2d 465 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court
addressed two issues "(1) When the State acquired the disputed strip by warranty
deed, did it acquire a fee simple interest or only an easement? And (2) Does the
abutting landowner (appellant) have a private easement along some part of the
abandoned highway?." Mason at 468. Neither of these two issues is germane to the
issue before this Court.
The tests set forth in Mason specifically are addressed to issues relating to the
location of public roads. Indeed the first issue was decided on the basis of statutes not
applicable and in one case repealed long before this case. Mason at 466-467. They
have nothing to do with platted subdivisions. In trying to twist the Mason decision,
Oak Lane has specifically ignored the holding of this Court in Carrier v. Lindquist, 37
12

P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001) limiting the holding to its facts. There this Court stated:
Defendants nevertheless contend that even if an easement exists over the alley, that
easement should be limited to access that is "reasonably necessary" under the
circumstances. Defendants rely on Mason v. State, in which this court held that a
private easement over a road vacated and destroyed by the State extended only insofar
as "the alternative access imposed measurable hardship that was unreasonable under
the circumstances." Id. at 469. Defendants argue that access to the entire 15 foot width
of the alley is not reasonably necessary because plaintiffs have primary access to the
front of their homes from Eleventh Avenue and because plaintiffs can still access their
backyards through the unobstructed 7 1/2-foot portion of the alley.
Defendants fail to note, however, a critical distinction between this case and Mason,
which involved a conflict between private and public entities. In order for a
government to be effective, it needs the power to establish or relocate public
throughways, even at the expense of some individual citizens, for the convenience and
safety of the general public. See id. ("The property owner's right to preserve the status
quo on access to and over abutting highways must be qualified by the public interest in
relocating public highways for greater advantage at minimum possible cost and in
facilitating the return of land to productive purposes.") In fact, cities are vested with
the statutory power to "lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade,
pave or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks,... and may
vacate the same ... by ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8 (1999).
No public entity is involved in this case. There is no private right of condemnation, nor
is there a need for one. One citizen has no entitlement to another citizen's property or a
right to obstruct another citizen's easement. It is a long-held tenet of property law that
a servient estate cannot" 'unreasonably restrict or interfere with the proper use of....
[an] easement' ". Wykoffv. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1982) (quoting N. Union
Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1976)).
We believe that applying the reasonable necessity test to disputes over private
easements would give a servient estate the power to obstruct an easement, and then
extinguish or limit that easement, by claiming that the easement was not reasonably
necessary for the easement holder to access his or her property. Such a result would in
essence acknowledge and permit a private right of condemnation. Private easement
holders should not be subjected to the burden of defending their existing easements as
reasonably necessary.
Carrier at 1117-1118.
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The Carrier Court's analysis puts to rest the claim of applicability of Mason. This
case involves no public entity, it simply involves two citizens where one is trying to
obstruct another. The Carrier decision is absolutely clear that in such an instance there is
no "reasonable necessity test".
B. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Interpreted Carrier.
As set forth above, this Court in Carrier clearly held that the Oak Lane private citizens
have no right to obstruct the Griffin's easement. The Court of Appeals recognized that
although this case involves a private lane and the Carrier case involved a public roads
right to a public easement exists in either case. Oak Lane at 67.
The key factor in Tuttle v. Sowadski. 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959 (1912), Carrier v.
Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001) and Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 97
P.3d 697 (Utah App. 2004) is whether the road at issue had been abandoned as a road
prior to the time the party claiming the easement had acquired the property. Oak Lane is
still being used and has been used as a road since the inception of the subdivision.2
The road has never been "abandoned". The designation of the road as a private lane as
opposed to a public road is irrelevant for purposes of determining a parties rights to an
easement over those adjoining streets. Cook v. Mighell Construction Company, Inc. 353
N.E.2d 43,46 (111. App. 1976) ("the purchasers of lots in the platted subdivision have a
right against the plattor or his privies, to have the tracts marked on the plat as roadways

2 "In accordance with our ruling, the trial court's conclusion that the Griffins had an easement to use the road based
on the deed's reference to the plat is sustainable as a matter of law giventhat Oak Lane was used as a roadway at
the time the Griffins obtained title to Lot 2 and is still used as a roadway." Griffin at 70 (emphasis added).

14

kept open for their use, regardless of whether they have been accepted as highways...)
Cummings v. Palmer, 753 S.W.2d 675,677 (Tenn. App, 1987) (In every road dedication
by plat there are two recipients of rights. Those recipients are the representative governing
body and the abutting landowners who purchased on the promise of the plat. The fee does
not rest in the governing body. That body has the right to accept the dedication as a public
trust and maintain the road. If the public body rejects that dedication, that fact does not
affect the fee and remaining rights in the abutting landowner.)
The attempt to stretch the delineation of the type of street into an abandonment,
apart from being a new argument being first raised in this Petition, makes no sense
factually, grammatically, or legally.
C. The Court of Appeals Did Not Ignore Evans.
Oak Lane argues that the case of Evans v. Board ofCty Cornmisioners, 97 P. 3d 697
(Utah App. 2004) "went unnoticed by the Oak Lane II court...". Oak Lane Petition pg. 13.
This is simply not true. Reference to the case is found in the Appellate Court decision at
pg. 70. There the Court noted that the Evans Court recognized "Utah's longstanding
doctrine that a private easement over platted streets arises upon the purchase of property
with reference to the plat map, so long as the roads have not been legally vacated prior to
the purchase." Oak Lane at 70.
The telling point is that the Evans decision required the roads at issue to have been
"legally vacated" prior to the existence of an exception to the public road issue. The
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undisputed facts of this case are that there was no legal vacation of Oak Lane prior to the
purchase of the Griffins, and there still has not been one as of this date.
In short, nothing has changed since the creation of the plat, and this new argument
notwithstanding, the case law cited by the Petitioner supports the Appellate Court's
petition that the Griffins have an easement on Oak Lane.
HI.

THERE IS UNANIMITY IN THE POSITIONS OF OTHER AUTHORITIES.
Oak Lane appears to be under the misperception that the learned treatises cited as

authority above, and in the Court of Appeals decision, are cited as binding precedent.
This simply is not true. The authorities are merely additional analysis of the issue
presented before the court. They represent well considered opinions based on not only
case authority, but statutory authority, statutory and case law history and comparisons of
those items in Utah with other jurisdictions.
The authorities unanimously support the position of the Griffins and the Court of
Appeals. Oak Lane has failed to cite a single "authority" supporting its position. Instead
it tries to strain the plain and simple language of the authorities to create an issue of facta
In challenging Powell on Real Property, Oak Lane fails to even be able to make a strained
argument on the basis of the language. Instead it falls back on the argument that Powell

3 An example is foot note 10 of Petitionees Petition where they claim a contradiction between the Am. Jur. Section
on Deed and that of Easements. The problem with this argument is that there is no conflict. The section on deeds
cited talks about conveyance of title, which is not even an issue m this case There is no dispute before the Court
ovei who owns Oak Lane, the issue is one of an easement over the load for the Griffins. Furthermore, a Plat is
clearly more than a simple map.
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fails to cite to a Utah case. As shown above all the Utah cases support the authorities
from other jurisdictions and the Court of Appeals decision in this case.
It is telling that Oak Lane has failed to show that the Court of Appeals
interpretation of Tuttle v. Sowadski, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959 (1912) is in error, or why
Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952) (This case involves
a duly platted subdivision containing streets and alleys and is thus distinguishable from
the authority cited by defendants. We have held, in a case cited even by defendants, that if
the dedicated streets of a subdivision are laid out and right to the use thereof has arisen, a
private easement arises therein which constitutes a vested proprietary interest in the lot
owners, which easement survives extinguishment of any co-existing public easement
calling for just compensation .) does not apply. The simple truth is that all case law and
other authorities support the decisions rendered in this case.
CONCLUSION
Utah law and the law as set forth in all learned treatises and the case law from
across the country all hold that when a subdivision plat is recorded showing streets and/or
alleys, a private easement in favor of the owners of property in the subdivision is created.
Oak Lane's only argument against this overwhelming weight of authority at trial
and on appeal was that Utah does not recognize this type of easement. As demonstrated
above this is simply not true.
Now, in its petition, Oak Lane tries to create a new legal argument that the
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dedication of Oak Lane as a private lane somehow constitutes an abandonment of the
street. Oak Lane has not cited to a single place in the record where such "fact" was
claimed. The Court of Appeals, based on the undisputed facts found the street was not
abandoned. Therefore even if this new argument could be addressed at this late stage in
the proceedings, It is simply based on a fact not properly plead and supported as required
by Rule 56 URCP. Furthermore in Boskovich this Court clearly held that a public
abandonment did not extinguish private easement rights.
The Court of Appeals decision is a correct finding in light of long established
precedent in Utah and across the country. The decision should accordingly be upheld.
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2010.
SHAWN D. TURNER, L.C.

Shawn D. Turner
Attorney for Respondent
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Hill, Johnson, & Schmutz
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300
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